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Executive Summary 
After the signing of the Paris Agreement, the policy landscape for the World Bank’s Carbon Initiative 
for Development (Ci-Dev) has changed substantially. Host country governments will no longer look at 
the generation of revenues from the Clean Development Mechanism alone, but need to assess the 
requirements of (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions ((I)NDCs), Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), and Low Emission Development Strategies (LEDSs). Given that host 
country governments want to access international climate finance and may be interested to mobilize 
mitigation co-benefits in the areas covered by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while  
becoming responsible for mitigation contributions of their own, they will now have to assess the 
specific requirements from different sources in order to identify the optimal  financial support they can 
secure  for achieving their mitigation outcomes. Against this background, the question arises whether 
Ci-Dev’s objectives could potentially be affected by the new policy framework and how it could 
prevent or at least reduce negative impacts. This is made more complex by the emergence of new 
market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement’s Articles 6.4 (in the following called in this report 
Sustainable Development Mechanism, SDM) and 6.2 (Cooperative Approaches, CAs) and the 
uncertainty whether and how the CDM projects could be transitionned into these future mechanisms.  
An immediate measure that Ci-Dev has put in place to ensure delivery of emission reduction credits, 
regardless of the type of market mechanism that survives in the long run, is to ensure that the 
ownership rights in the  Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) for all Ci-Dev projects 
cover both units under   the CDM and the relevant new market mechanism that will exist  after 2020.  
In the short term until 2020, Ci-Dev should – in collaboration with other departments of the World 
Bank group – promote the benefits of a continued use of market mechanisms. Thereby, the risk of 
discontinuation of CDM projects due to lack of revenues from buyers other than Ci-Dev could be 
reduced. Moreover, Ci-Dev should support rulemaking under the UNFCCC that ensures that as many 
elements of the CDM as possible are taken up in the SDM, and that CDM projects are either directly 
accepted under the SDM, or be brought into the SDM through a simple procedure. This can take the 
form of submissions on the design of the SDM. 
Ci-Dev should also monitor progress on CAs which could become an alternative route of continuation 
of crediting of Ci-Dev programs post CDM. 
This could be underpinned by Ci-Dev supporting “lighthouse activities”, i.e. programs of activity 
(PoAs) that are particularly beneficial with regards to supporting the SDGs. Moreover, such 
lighthouse activities could show ways forward regarding upscaling of mitigation – developing PoAs 
that are linked to the setup of a policy instrument that eventually generates credits and / or that serve 
as cornerstone of a NAMA. 
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At the same time as it tries to ensure that the international framework is conducive to continued 
operation of market mechanisms, Ci-Dev should proactively address those risks that could result in 
activities delivering less than the contracted CER volumes due to overlaps between mitigation 
activities included in NDCs and Ci-Dev activities. In other words ensure that if CERs are included in 
an NDC target they are not also included in the Ci-Dev program, which if it occurred would trigger 
double counting issues. In order to ensure its activities are always seen as additional, Ci-Dev should 
engage proactively with host countries regarding the design of NDCs and strategies to attract climate 
finance. 
Due to the status of the World Bank it is unlikely that governments would withdraw approval letters 
from activities supported directly through the Ci-Dev for other purposes such as securing higher 
revenues from NAMAs or retaining mitigation outcomes to ensure that their NDC target is reached. 
However, these issues could become a significant deterrent for private project developers trying to 
replicate the lessons learnt from the Ci-Dev experience. The degree of ambition required by the Paris 
Agreement requires the full engagement of a broad range of project developers, and this needs a 
trustworthy governance environment.   
As the risks discussed are not proportional to host country climate policy engagement, we 
recommend that Ci-Dev particularly engages with governments of countries with active Ci-Dev 
operational engagement that also have  ambitious NDCs and NAMAs and high levels of NDC 
conditionality on climate finance such as Ethiopia and Rwanda to reduce the potential risks to Ci-Dev. 
Capacity building that support government officials can help to generate realistic views on the 
complementarity of climate finance flows. Moreover, Ci-Dev should support work on standardized 
crediting approaches to facilitate the transition of Ci-Dev projects to the SDM whilst supporting NDC 
implementation. A “standardized crediting framework”, which would build on several elements of 
standardization and simplification (standardized baselines, additionality determination at the sectoral 
level, simplified MRV processes, and a reformed project cycle), could become an effective approach 
to crediting at a scaled-up level.  
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda (Catgory A low risk) and also Senegal (Category B middle risk) 
offer the highest level of opportunities for experimentation with innovative approaches to scaling up of 
mitigation action toward NAMAs and INDCs and for piloting activities toward the SDM, especially 
through PoAs serving as key basis for mitigation under a NAMA and. Feasibility studies and pilot 
activities could be combined with capacity building toward crediting of policy actions.  Given that the 
significant mitigation policy experience in these countries reduces barriers to the actual 
implementation of Ci-Dev projects, such an engagement is likely to have significant benefits 
Overall, Ci-Dev has the opportunity to contribute to the development of new market mechanisms by 
both showing that project and programmatic activities work on the ground, while supporting a 
conducive national and international policy framework. Only such an integrated approach will ensure 
that market mechanisms can play a crucial role in achieving the long-term goal of keeping global 
warming well below 2°C. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the recent years, the global carbon market in the context of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has seen difficult times. Prices for CDM credits (CERs) plummeted 
by 95% between 2011 and 2013, and the market essentially stalled. Only a handful of governments 
are continuing to buy CERs; total demand between 2015 and 2020 is estimated at around 77 million 
(UNFCCC 2016c, p. 4-5). However, carbon market infrastructure such as CDM methodologies and 
governance infrastructure is also being utilized to deliver results-based finance. One of the most 
notable initiatives in this regard is the World Bank’s Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev).  
Recent and future international climate policy developments may influence the operating conditions 
for Ci-Dev. The Paris Agreement (PA, UNFCCC 2016d) provides a firm basis for the post-2020 global 
climate regime, under which all countries are expected to contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation. 
Almost 190 countries have submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for 
mitigation and adaptation. As the PA contains a full article on market mechanisms, there is renewed 
certainty that carbon market mechanisms will remain a key component of the portfolio of instruments 
to reach the goals of the PA. Art 6.4 PA establishes a centrally governed market mechanism for 
mitigation. The rules for this mechanism shall be based on the experience with the Kyoto Protocol 
mechanisms including the CDM. The evolution of Art 6.4 – the Sustainable Development Mechanism 
(SDM) as it is often called – might therefore be expected to interact closely with the ongoing reform of 
the CDM. Some might aim to distance the SDM somewhat from the CDM in order to address some of 
the CDM’s shortcomings. Additionally, Art. 6.2 enables countries to engage in a non-centrally 
governed set of cooperative approaches (CAs) for mitigation. The mechanisms will give rise to 
Internationally Transferable Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). The degree to which international rules 
will apply to the CAs remains to be seen; we expect this to be clarified by the UNFCCC negotiations 
before the entry into force of the PA. 
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Figure 1: Emissions unit transfers under the Paris Agreement 
 
The fundamental difference between the PA and the Kyoto Protocol is that mitigation responsibilities 
are now defined through a bottom-up instead of a top-down system. Under the evolving PA 
framework, all parties are free to define their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) according 
to general principles, and international guidance is then fleshed out on the basis of “broad” 
consensus. The PA, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, does not make a clear distinction between buyers or 
sellers of mitigation units, which will affect supply and demand. While developing countries under the 
CDM had no opportunity costs of selling emissions credits, under the Paris Mechanisms they will 
need to mobilize other mitigation options to reach their NDC, provided that the NDC goes beyond 
business as usual. Some observers fear that governments may be reluctant to sell credits at all. 
Moreover, the PA is broader in scope allowing for different forms of market mechanisms which will 
compete against each other. In this environment the future role of the CDM and crediting 
mechanisms in general is unclear. 
After the Paris Agreement instruments specified by the Kyoto Protocol need to adapt to the evolving 
climate framework initially defined by the Paris Agreement. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs) for example are not explicitly mentioned, however the Paris Agreement emphasizes the 
need for the implementation of national mitigation actions, climate finance, sustainable development 
and MRV. These are all important elements of NAMAs. High level commitments in NDCs therefore 
give greater purpose and a sense of urgency to NAMAs. Similarly Low Emissions Development 
Strategies (LEDS) after the Paris Agreement likely focus on providing support for capacity building 
and technical assistance to enhance and support the achievement of NDC goals.  
The definition of national mitigation targets through the NDCs, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs) and other mitigation policies result in increasing complexity, especially in terms of 
process and accounting regulations This is likely to affect CDM projects and program (PoA) 
operations through regulatory changes affecting their business models. Furthermore, climate finance 
is rapidly evolving and there is great pressure in particular on the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to 
rapidly disburse its funds of about 10 billion USD and demonstrate concrete outcomes. Some 
stakeholders have proposed that the GCF should use the existing CDM infrastructure or even acquire 
already issued certified emission credits (CERs) from the CDM. Given that the current pipeline of Ci-
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Dev projects relies on payment at the generation of CERs as the core of its results-based finance 
approach, how the future development of a reformed CDM or its transitioning to the PA mechanisms 
will be done is crucial for the overall outcome of Ci-Dev. 
We assess the implications of INDCs, NAMAs, Low Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS) and 
related instruments on Ci-Dev's objectives and present preliminary recommendations for addressing 
potential risks for Ci-Dev's operations as well as potential opportunities in a policy environment that is 
rapidly evolving on the international level as well as the host country level. 
1.2 Ci-Dev's scope of activities 
Projects in all African countries that receive International Development Assistance (IDA) as well as 
those Asian countries classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to the United 
Nations (UN) definition are eligible for Ci-Dev support (Ci-Dev 2013). Projects from 39 African 
countries and 9 Asian countries are thus eligible (see the annexed table for a complete list). A 
minimum of 75% of all projects within the final portfolio shall be located in LDCs at the time of their 
selection and around 80% of all projects should be based in Africa. 
Ci-Dev projects are to focus on renewable energy and underrepresented sectors and to be innovative 
and transformational in nature. The former category focuses on projects improving energy access. 
The latter category can comprise several project types including electrification, improved energy 
efficiency, and waste management. In general, Ci-Dev aims to support small to medium scale 
projects and programs that demonstrate how carbon finance can benefit poor or vulnerable 
communities, deliver development benefits alongside emissions reductions, and result in financial 
savings or welfare improvements. All projects must become registered CDM activities or result in 
carbon credits that are recognized by the UNFCCC – potentially including under the Paris 
Mechanisms. 
As of June 2016, Ci-Dev has selected 13 CDM PoAs for technical assistance and CER procurement 
over parts or their full lifetimes in the areas of energy access to sustainable energy including rural 
electrification (grid extension, mini-grid, solar lighting and solar home systems), low-carbon cooking 
and low-carbon water filtration in Sub-Saharan African countries. The Ci-Dev will close on Dec. 31, 
2025 (see  
Figure 2) and therefore following the Paris Agreement there are concerns about new risks; regarding 
the use of credits which could be directed towards NDC compliance, and also regarding the status of 
the CDM as a standard.  
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Figure 2 Ci-Dev timeline 
 
 
1.3 New and evolving elements in international climate policy 
Most low income country INDCs are explicitly conditional on receiving international climate finance. 
Efforts by countries to achieve their NDC targets can raise a number of questions regarding their 
potential interference with other mechanisms and financing instruments in the international climate 
policy landscape. 
The importance of NAMAs established by the Bali Action Plan in 2007 may be strengthened following 
COP 21 once countries need to take concrete action to achieve their NDCs. A credible role for 
NAMAs in developing countries will however depend on the availability of international support. 
NAMAs can represent a bundle of financial and regulatory measures seeking to reduce emissions 
within one particular sector. They are quite varied in their combinations of measures – even including 
project-based or programmatic mechanisms. In specific cases, NAMA implementation can have 
positive or negative implications for the operation of CDM projects due to e.g. regulatory changes 
endangering renewal for a second crediting period, or overlapping activities between NAMA and 
existing PoAs resulting in public criticism of double counting of emissions reductions. PoAs and 
NAMAs in the same activity area can, however, be designed in a way to reinforce synergies. An 
example of such a combined approach can be found in Rwanda; its health NAMA (see Ngabo et al. 
2013), which is being developed jointly between DelAgua and the Rwandan Ministry of Health in form 
of a public-private partnership, envisages shared responsibilities for roll-out and extensive MRV of 
water filters and efficient cook stoves on the basis of programmatic CDM activates. 
In the 2010 Cancun UNFCCC COP member states were encouraged to establish low emission 
development strategies (LEDS) – a concept that can be seen as purposefully vague and which never 
really took a concrete shape neither in later negotiations nor through commonly accepted guidance. 
As such, LEDS can be viewed as broader and more comprehensive strategies and policies that 
define a long-term trajectory, explicitly referring to issues directly relevant to climate change 
mitigation but not in and of themselves representing regulatory changes.  
The Impact of INDCs, NAMAs and LEDS on Ci-Dev Operations and Programs 
 Page 12 
Similarly, sustainable development priorities can in most countries only be explicitly identified in the 
approval criteria of the Designated National Authority (DNA) for CDM project proposals. Where 
Parties have chosen to apply clear and transparent criteria, the criteria can serve as indication of 
these sustainable development priorities. Changes in these priorities do, however, in principle not 
affect ongoing CDM activities and as such are not of great relevance to Ci-Dev operations. 
1.4 Objectives 
We assess whether observed and expected developments in Ci-Dev eligible host countries and at 
the level of international climate policy can have impacts on CER accrual to Ci-Dev or whether other 
risks and opportunities could arise from the Paris Agreement. These questions are addressed both 
through a general discussion of international climate policy developments and their implications on 
the objectives of Ci-Dev as well as an evaluation of the 48 eligible countries with regard to the key 
questions outlined in box 1.  
Box 1: The three key questions of the country evaluation 
1) Is there a real risk that host countries prevent project owners from selling CERs to Ci-Dev 
because the host country governments want to use these CERs for compliance with their NDC, 
effectively expropriating project owners and leading to lower CER availability for the Ci-Dev CER 
pipeline than expected?  
2) Is there a real risk that the CDM falls into obsolescence (i.e. the institutional and 
administrative infrastructure for processing the CDM no longer operates)  before the end of the 
Ci-Dev purchasing program in 2024 as a result of:  
i) a lack of market activity resulting in the stop of CER generation and issuances within 
the Ci-Dev purchasing period of June 30, 2025 (See Figure 2)? Or  
ii) countries utilising other market mechanisms rather than the CDM within the Ci-Dev 
purchasing period (i.e. up to June 30, 2025 (see Figure 2)?  
3) Is there a risk that the environmental integrity of CDM projects could be threatened by: 
 i) development of new national policies e.g. renewable energy targets, energy efficiency 
targets etc. that could lead to the CDM projects being seen as business as usual by 
media and the general public? Or 
ii) concerns that CERs cannot be properly accounted for resulting in an increased risk of 
double claiming (see textbox 2)  because a host country lists  
the emission reductions in the reports on progress regarding its NDC? 
 
In chapters 2-7 below, we present currently evolving climate policy developments and their respective 
risks and opportunities for Ci-Dev operations and objectives. Chapter 8 analyses risks and 
opportunities at the country level through a systematic literature study of INDCs, NAMAs, LEDS and 
related documents. Finally, chapter 9 offers conclusions and a number of specific recommendations 
for Ci-Dev operations and further research needs. 
 
The Impact of INDCs, NAMAs and LEDS on Ci-Dev Operations and Programs 
 Page 13 
2 The political economy of (I)NDCs and the consequences 
for Ci-Dev 
2.1 Best case: a consistent hierarchy where ambition matches policy plans 
The report assesses  LEDS, the (I)NDC and the NAMAs since they all serve mitigation goals and in 
the best case, work within countries  at different hierarchical levels and combine as mutually 
supporting and complimentary tools to facilitate national mitigation efforts: LEDS represent a long-
term policy vision over a long time horizon, (I)NDCs provide the quantified emissions reductions 
objectives while NAMAs represent the sector-specific actions, which can attract international support 
to produce measurable mitigation outcomes achieved by appropriate financial or regulatory policy 
instruments. In the ideal case the ambition, which is often expressed by a mitigation scenario below 
the specified business as usual scenario, matches realistic mitigation potentials of planned policies. 
2.2 Baseline and mitigation scenarios without robust foundation 
Many INDCs (see Annex) are based on scenarios that were either not constructed with a real 
assessment of mitigation potentials, where the assessment did either not consider NAMAs properly 
(possible overlaps) or there are no NAMAs being developed at all. There may also be cases, in which 
the NDC overestimates mitigation potentials. Finally there are cases, where the (I)NDCs were 
designed with low stringency. 
2.3 Inconsistent patchwork of policies 
The reality in most countries is that LEDs, INDCs and NAMAs rarely are mutually supportive, due to 
disconnected implementation and differences in fundamental assumptions e.g. regarding the 
approaches applied to determine  baseline scenarios. Furthermore some difficulties arise from the 
fact that these instruments are often defined over different time horizons and some countries’ INDCs 
do not even acknowledge the role of NAMAs. These inconsistencies are primarily due to the fact that 
there is no common basis for accounting for NAMAs within national INDCs which are often developed 
by different government agencies and external consultants each with very limited resources and 
opportunities for vertical and horizontal integration. Besides limited time and financial resources, 
institutional structures can prevent the necessary consultative processes from taking place. As 
indicated in our subsequent country-level assessment, the level of coordination between climate 
policy instruments varies significantly. 
2.4 Activity overlaps and double counting 
A major concern in this context is that overlapping activities result in either a late realization that 
mitigation pledges were overambitious or that the same emissions reductions are continuously 
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claimed twice or double counted and thus can result in a bad reputation due to low environmental 
integrity (see Box 2). 
Box 2: Double counting 
Schneider et al. (2015) differentiate three principal forms of double counting: double 
issuance – the issuance of two units for the same reductions, double use –either by the 
same country or by two different countries - and double claiming of reductions – the 
accounting of the same reductions both in a greenhouse gas inventory and in units towards 
attaining an external mitigation pledge or counting the same reductions toward two different 
sectoral NAMAs. The latter concept was brought into the UNFCCC negotiations by Prag et 
al. (2013). For achieving environmental integrity all forms of double counting need to be 
eliminated. 
Hood (2015) stresses the greater variety of flows of units under the PA that makes it more 
difficult to prevent double counting compared to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Figure 3: Different types of units created under the Paris Agreement 
 
Source: Hood (2015) 
 
Similarly, design of policy instruments in the context of NAMAs often insufficiently addresses 
interferences between sectors. Figure 4 shows an overlap of mitigation activities between two 
NAMAs with the activity electricity co-generation from landfill gas capture as NAMA in the renewable 
energy and another NAMA in the waste sector. Without corrections for such overlaps, governments 
may incorrectly calculate their mitigation achievements towards an INDC by simply adding up all the 
mitigation reported by the NAMAs.  
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Figure 4: Double counting in NAMAs leading to mitigation shortfall in NDCs. 
 
 
3 From the CDM to the Paris Mechanisms: Risks and 
Opportunities 
The greatest macro-trend of relevance to Ci-Dev is the fragmentation of market mechanisms. 
Although with the introduction of a centrally governed mechanism, the PA provides the basis to 
develop a successor to the CDM and a broader set of bilateral mechanisms under the umbrella term 
CAs, the uncertainty is now no longer whether market instruments will be part of the post-2020 
regime, but whether there will be a critical mass of countries which participate in the SDM to generate 
sufficient supply and demand for emission reductions. Will there be a constructive linking between 
the CDM and SDM, which could facilitate the transition of the institutional structure of the CDM to the 
SDM? Will policies in the future build on CDM type of activities? Will there be a strengthened role for 
Sustainable Development under the SDM? And finally, could emissions reductions units from the 
CDM be eligible under the SDM?  
3.1 From Kyoto to Paris: Learning from the CDM? 
Explicit reference to “apply experience from Kyoto Mechanisms” (UNFCCC 2016d, para 37f Paris 
Decision, PD) indicates that there is broad agreement among Parties to build on the successful 
reform of the CDM. All the key elements of the SDM defined in Art. 6 would allow taking over of key 
procedural and institutional structure elements of the CDM:  
 supervised by a body designated by the CMA (Art. 6.4) 
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 payment of adaptation tax (Art. 6.6) 
 authorization of public and private entities by Party (Art. 6.4b) 
 accounting for  credit transfer in buyer and seller countries to prevent double counting (Art. 
6.4c, 6.5) 
And the rules, which are to be developed by CMA, shall according to para 37 PD (UNFCCC 2016d) 
be based on principles that are also highly compatible with the principles underlying the CDM:  
 Real, measurable and long term mitigation (para 37b PD)  
 Specific definition of scopes of activities (para 37c PD)  
 Additionality (para 37d PD) 
 Verification and certification by DOEs (para37e PD)  
All of this indicates that there is broad agreement among Parties to build on key principles of the 
CDM including notably elements of standardization and the programmatic approach, on which Ci-Dev 
was established. How far the actual mechanism survives remains to be seen given unease of various 
parties, not least the EU regarding its performance and role in the future. Therefore, a critical 
question for Ci-Dev regards the future of the CDM pipeline, and post-2020 eligibility of CERs.  
3.2 Scenarios of transition from the CDM to the SDM 
The transition from the CDM to SDM could result in one or a nuanced combination of the following 
stylized scenarios depending on the SDM’s scope, i.e. whether it includes activities at project-, 
program- or sectoral level: 
1. Full acceptance of CDM projects and direct use of the CDM modalities and procedures 
under the SDM. For example, the CDM Executive Board would become the SDM EB, CDM 
DOEs would automatically become SDM DOEs, CDM methodologies for baselines and 
monitoring become SDM methodologies and so forth. These rules would then be 
complemented by modalities and procedures for crediting of mitigation policy instruments 
and sectoral mitigation. CERs would continue to be issued after 2020. The likelihood of a 
direct acceptance of the CDM under the SDM – as well as CER demand – would increase if 
the ongoing CDM reform continues to progress and expands the scope of PoAs and 
enhances standardization and simplification including of baselines, automatic additionality 
determination, and MRV: This might alleviate the widely held perception that the CDM is 
regionally and sectorally biased, inefficient and expensive, and its procedures are difficult to 
scale up. 
2. Selective use of CDM modalities and procedures under the SDM, which is managed by new 
institutions. CDM projects can apply for recognition under the SDM, and then issue SDM 
units after 2020.  
a. CERs issued before 2020 can also be converted into SDM units 
b. Post-2020 CERs cannot be converted into SDM units (only full-on SDM projects 
generate SDM units post-2020). 
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3. No use of the CDM after 2020. There is no possibility to have CDM projects generate credits 
under the SDM after 2020, as institutions and rules of the SDM would be completely distinct. 
In such a scenario, CDM institutions would have to make the case for the CDM to be 
accepted by some countries as Cooperative Approach (CA, such CAs would then be 
accepting CDM credits: Climate finance institutions buying of CERs would probably run out 
due to the lacking perspective of the CDM.  
4. CDM continues in parallel to SDM post 2020. The CDM continues as a separate mechanism 
under the umbrella of Art. 6 due to a wide interpretation of this Article. There will be a 
division of labor between the CDM and the SDM that could take two forms: 
- the former concentrates on crediting of projects and PoAs while the SDM focuses on crediting 
of policies. 
– the former can be accessed by a certain group of countries, e.g. LDCs, while the SDM is 
accessible to middle income counties and emerging economies. 
3.3 Building on Programs of Activities for design of NAMAs and scaled-up crediting 
under the SDM 
The interaction between national mitigation policies i.e. NAMAs and CDM activities or PoAs 
generates challenges, but it has enormous potential to advance scaled-up mitigation action if 
implemented correctly. Robust design of hybrid PoA and/or NAMA structures requires careful 
consideration of a number of accounting, MRV and institutional aspects and the experience in such 
approaches is limited (Michaelowa et al. 2015). A “standardized crediting framework”, which would 
build on several elements of standardization and simplification (standardized baselines, additionality 
determination at the sectoral level, simplified MRV processes, and a reformed project cycle), could 
become an effective approach to crediting at a scaled-up level. This would in particular be helpful for 
activities that are geographically dispersed or which require a certain scale for economic viability as is 
the case for rural electrification. MRV and the CDM project cycle are areas where further 
standardization seems possible. Currently progress has been made in standardizing baselines and 
additionality. To demonstrate the feasibility of further standardization, the World Bank considers 
identifying a pilot activity from the Ci-Dev activities in which all elements of a “standardized crediting 
framework” covering the baseline, additionality, MRV and the project cycle would be applied in 
parallel to the regular CDM standards and procedures 
Ci-Dev has actively contributed to exploring sustainable business models to support effective 
crediting for energy access projects. These experiences are highly relevant exploring possible 
pathways for transitioning from the CDM to the SDM.  
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4 Critical design elements of the SDM beyond the CDM 
Compared to the Kyoto mechanisms there are two aspects in which the SDM could be different: the 
SDM could address SD in a more centralized manner and according to the Paris Agreement has to 
contribute to global emissions reductions. 
4.1 Sustainable Development in the SDM: growing but yet uncertain relevance  
From a climate policy standpoint previously considered an “outside-topic”, sustainable development 
has become a more important factor in the climate policy landscape: in 2015, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) were internationally agreed (UN General Assembly 2015) and while their 
role for the UNFCCC regime remains unclear, it can be expected that the SDGs will assume an 
increasingly prominent role in measuring development and quite possibly also climate finance results. 
On the domestic level, preferences for sustainable development are often expressed at various levels 
of detail and often without real coherence between various policy documents such as the NAMAs, 
INDCs or national energy- or climate strategies etc. In view of this growing importance, CDM host 
countries – including those eligible for Ci-Dev support – could in principle require more stringent 
demonstrations of how activities contribute to their SD as a precondition for renewal of activities for a 
second crediting period. While this would incur some additional transaction costs, Ci-Dev project 
activities are without exception extremely likely to comply with SD criteria due to the substantial 
social, environmental and economic benefits that these activity types generate. We therefore do not 
view SD criteria and indicators to become a problematic policy element for Ci-Dev operations. If their 
relevance in operationalizing the SDM is greatly enhanced compared to past experience with the 
CDM (e.g. SD criteria figuring as strong prerequisites to participate in the mechanism), it is possible 
that the SDM would remain a very limited source of credits due to the additional challenges for 
project developers. Even if this was the case, ongoing CDM projects – and the standing of the Ci-Dev 
program – would in all likelihood gain rather than lose – as the host countries would benefit from 
exploiting the freedom of choice associated with the CDM’s lack of mandatory SD criteria. 
4.2 Overall mitigation in global emissions 
Article 6.4d PA asks that the mechanism is ”to deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions“. This 
clause can be interpreted in various ways.  
For ambitious NDCs and provided that the market mechanism is based on realistic baselines, the 
mechanism delivers an overall mitigation in global emissions as it facilitates the achievement of the 
ambitious NDCs. In that context, no further specific rules for the mechanism would be required to 
achieve global mitigation, and no transaction costs or distortions would accrue. 
In the case where at least some of the NDCs are not sufficiently ambitious, there is a risk that the 
market mechanism leads to a  cheap surplus of mitigation that could depress the price in the carbon 
market to a point where it can no longer incentivise mitigation action. In this way less ambitious NDCs 
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can negatively impact ambitious NDCs. To prevent this and to ensure that the mechanism delivers an 
overall mitigation, various options have been proposed. All of them will increase the transaction cost 
of the mechanism and crowd out efficient mitigation; some will also lead to distortions in the choice of 
mitigation options. The simplest option would be to voluntarily cancel units instead of using them for 
compliance with NDCs. Discounting of credits by a certain percentage would at least not lead to 
distortions between different mitigation options and be transparent.  The discounting should occur at 
the point of accounting for traded credits. Introducing indirect discounting within methodologies (i.e. at 
the production side of credits), e.g. through overly stringent baselines for calculation of mitigation 
achieved by the mechanism would lead to differentiated impacts depending on the mitigation 
technology and decrease efficiency significantly in some cases to the point of making crediting 
instruments unviable. 
Any approaches to introduce discounting or make baselines more conservative than under the 
current CDM would impact Ci-Dev operations when crediting periods are up for renewal by 
decreasing CER volumes. 
5 Potential climate policy risks for Ci-Dev activities 
In the following we specify the possible reasons for each of the three key risks listed in section 1.2 on 
Ci-Dev operations identified above. Figure 5 illustrates the three principal risks to Ci-Dev operations 
with regard to continued CER accrual.  
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Figure 5: Policy level risks to CER generation for Ci-Dev  
  
Circle 1 represents the risk that occurs if a host country’s DNA rejects the PoA or does not undertake 
any efforts to maintain a regulatory environment conducive to a PoA’s continued operation, e.g. 
collection of data required to apply the selected baseline and monitoring methodology, because it no 
longer thinks that the CDM has a future. Circle 2 relates to the risk that due to discontinuation of the 
Executive Board or the CDM registry administrator, no CERs can be issued any more. Circle 3 
means that the host country withdraws the approval letter because it decides to sell credits under a 
more attractive mechanism, or because it needs the credits to fulfil its NDC. Circle 4 represents a 
non-registered CDM project because it is no longer deemed additional after the introduction of a 
NAMA or it is not able to qualify for a new crediting period. Circle 5 represents the risk of loss of 
credibility and environmental integrity of CERs due to either perceived double claiming of mitigation 
by the CDM activity and the host country or due to perverse incentives resulting from additional 
financial incentives or regulations implemented via a NAMA. Circle 6 represents the risk that the 
CDM project is unable to sell CERs to other buyers apart from Ci-Dev and the revenues received 
from Ci-Dev are insufficient for the developer to continue its operation.  
5.1 Temporal aspects of risks  
On a fundamental level one can distinguish pre-2020 risks from post-2020. Risks regarding double 
claiming under an NDC only become relevant after 2020 unless there is an “early action” provision in 
the NDC. Given that the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol provides for a clear legal 
situation with regard to the CDM, the risk that the CDM stops to exist before 2020 is virtually zero. If 
scenario 3 materializes and the CDM ceases to exist post-2020, or CERs cannot be converted into 
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the credits under the SDM due to formal regulations, Ci-Dev would depend on the emergence of new 
SDM projects or a transition of former CDM activities into the SDM for acquisition of credits in 2020-
2024. Under scenario 1 where emissions reductions units from ongoing CDM activities are directly 
accepted in the SDM after the 2020 milestone, Ci-Dev could essentially continue buying units from 
the same activities. Under Article 6.2, alternative mechanisms with higher prices could already 
become relevant before 2020 if there is no vintage limit on pre-2020 units. Mechanisms such as the 
Japanese Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)1 could be such an example.  
Future demand for CERs will affect viability of PoAs. It is possible that demand further declines, 
which could put the financial viability of activities supported by Ci-Dev at risk and potentially force Ci-
Dev to purchase a larger share of CERs from such activities to prevent their termination. 
There is also a fundamental risk regarding the post-2020 world, which concerns the very core of Ci-
Dev’s objective to enable carbon markets: if elaborating the accounting rules for new market 
instruments does not progress until 2020, international market mechanisms in general could suffer 
from insufficient clarity on how to use markets to contribute to NDCs. A trigger for such a 
development could be a failure to agree on the interpretation on how to achieve the “overall mitigation 
of global emissions“ under the SDM specified in Art 6.4.d. Also if key countries are seen as not fully 
supporting implementation of the PA, demand for credits from market mechanisms would evaporate 
and credit price remain close to zero. Currently, the strong show of high-level support as observed 
e.g. by 175 Parties signing the Agreement on the first day of the signature period attenuates this risk. 
In addition, the prominent positioning of market instruments in Article 6 and the high ambition along 
with the transparency framework of the PA are further indications that this risk is low. Supporting an 
“early start” phase of the SDM utilising existing activities, such as those under Ci-Dev could help 
define best practice and improve the chances for a significant role of the SDM as an instrument for 
implementing the PA.  
We will now discuss the three key risks in detail. 
5.2 Political risks for CER accrual 
While we note that this risk is limited and very unlikely to occur, there are two possible reasons why a 
host country might no longer want CERs to be allocated to CDM projects (see circle 3 in  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 The JCM is a bilateral crediting mechanism between Japan and selected – currently 16 – developing countries 
for promoting mitigation (see Dransfeld et al. 2015a, b). 
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Figure 5) that include 
a) Counting the mitigation toward its own NDC (post-2020)2, or  
b) Achieving a higher revenue from selling mitigation units outside the CDM (both pre- and post-
2020).  
The driver for counting reductions towards an NDC might develop once NDCs become binding in the 
post-2020 regime. Countries which have defined highly ambitious NDCs (see Annex) could 
potentially come under pressure from domestic interest groups that are affected by mitigation policies 
to count all mitigation achieved in the country towards its own NDC and thus alleviate pressure for 
further measures for cutting emissions. If the NDC contains elements that are conditional to receipt of 
international climate finance (which is the case in almost all Ci-Dev countries), the government could 
argue that revenues from CER sale are climate finance, especially if no international climate finance 
is allocated to the country. Therefore, it would feel entitled to expropriate project owners and 
incorporate the corresponding revenues for implementing its NDC. This risk is amplified for public 
sector owned Ci-Dev activities, as the government directly receives CERs, and therefore would not 
need to negotiate with private sector project developers in case it decides to use CERs for NDC 
achievement. This situation theoretically applies to several Ci-Dev activities e.g. the energy access 
PoAs in Ethiopia. The situation could look as follows: the ambitious Ethiopian NDC is contingent on 
receiving a significant amount of international climate finance. The government of Ethiopia has set up 
a dedicated institution – the CRGE Facility – to administer incoming climate finance, and is 
developing a full suite of proposals for the GCF. Assuming that these proposals are rejected, the 
government would now come under pressure to fill the CRGE Facility through other means. It could 
declare that the revenues from sale of Ci-Dev PoAs should anyway have been unconditional grants 
to Ethiopia and thus the CERs become state property. 
                                                     
2 If the recipient country cancels the CER there is no risk 
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However, given that Ci-Dev primarily operates in low-income countries, some of which have not even 
determined quantified mitigation targets and all of which are unlikely to be heavily pressured in case 
of underperformance, the risk that Ci-Dev host countries resort to withdrawing approval letters in 
order to achieve their NDCs in the absence of international climate finance seems highly improbable. 
It is probably more likely that countries would fail to fulfil their NDC and argue this is due to a lack of 
support. Such a claim would not impact Ci-Dev activities directly but of course the perceived quality 
of the credits would suffer from the default on the NDC.   
The risk of the host government using the mitigation achieved by Ci-Dev projects towards its own 
NDC is very limited given countries’ relationships with the World Bank Group and governments who 
are the Ci-Dev financiers. The risk of a project owner selling to a different buyer other than Ci-Dev in 
order to achieve higher prices despite existing purchase agreements depends on the price differential 
and to which extent the rule of law would prevent breaking contractual agreements; again it is unlikely 
if the seller wants to remain in international business. These risks might however be significant for 
non-Ci-Dev buyers of CERs which lack the same standing in the host country as the World Bank. 
However, this risk only occurs in countries that do not honour private property rights (see risk of doing 
business ranking included in the Annex).  
The key question is then at what level of political pressure regarding NDC implementation 
governments would actually start to expropriate CER from buyers other than the World Bank. This 
question, which goes beyond the scope of our assessment, could be evaluated in greater depth in a 
dedicated study. 
5.3 Project operation disruption due to CDM obsolescence or low CDM attractiveness 
compared to alternative mechanisms 
A second risk is that the CDM as a tool for evaluating mitigation outcomes internationally and 
nationally becomes obsolete as host countries are busy embracing new opportunities in the climate 
finance (e.g. applications for support by the GCF) and carbon market areas or the activities no longer 
comply with new eligibility requirements (e.g. the SDM in case of scenario 3 – if it is not compatible 
with CDM activities). As a consequence, regulatory bodies for CDM projects or PoAs could simply 
discontinue and CER issuance could be stopped post-2020. Governments might also revoke letters 
of approval (see circle 1 and 2 in 
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Figure 5). This could result in a deterioration of CDM activities in one country or even spill over into 
other countries in the region – especially in the case of multi-country PoAs. Whilst this risk is 
conceivable both in a pre and a post-2020 world and largely a function of a country’s general capacity 
and willingness to take coordinated action for climate mitigation as expressed by our evaluation of 
countries in three categories (see Annex), it is limited since such a collapse would undermine 
investors’ confidence in the international regulatory regime. If this risk was to materialize it is only 
envisaged in countries that are characterized by limited human capacity in government institutions, 
bad governance and a low degree of trust. Also countries undergoing a dramatic shift in government 
might be prone to that risk, because the new government wants to distance itself from activities 
undertaken by the previous government. 
Before 2020 all Ci-Dev emissions reductions are CERs under the CDM. After December 31, 2020, 
Ci-Dev will purchase and renegotiate emissions reductions units under a standard comparable to the 
CDM agreed upon by Parties or between Ci-Dev and the program entities. Such a renegotiation 
would require consideration of eligibility for a new non-CDM standard that may be required for the 
post-2020 volumes, and further sovereign approval (such as  LOAs in the CDM). At the same time it 
would allow to take up analogue commitments with the same stakeholders if their respective activities 
could produce SDM units post-2020.  
If a host country sees the CDM as losing relevance or being subject to continuous market 
uncertainty, it might dismantle regulatory capacities or realign them towards domestic policy action 
(e.g. NAMAs) and the implementation of NDC targets or the wish to focus on attracting climate 
finance from large funding sources such as the GCF. This risk is real, and to some degree already 
occurring. On the other hand, there are also opportunities associated with integrating programmatic 
activities with NAMAs if such hybrid approaches are designed carefully. 
5.4 Reputational and environmental integrity risk 
Broadly speaking, trust, reputation and environmental integrity of market instruments are interrelated 
issues and currently an important challenge. This challenge directly relates to the implicit objective of 
Ci-Dev to reliably reduce emissions through high-quality projects. Public perception plays an 
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important role: Environmental integrity could suffer as a result of inadequate efforts to prevent double 
counting (see circle 5 in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5). Double counting can take various forms3, including double counting in a narrower sense of 
actually simply counting the same CER twice, but also varieties such as double claiming of emissions 
reductions on both the policy-level (i.e. NAMAs and NDCs) and level of Ci-Dev projects, or on the 
level of Ci-Dev projects and that of other carbon market mechanisms (bilateral instruments such as 
the Japanese Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM). Perverse incentives could potentially result from 
financial support through policy instruments other than the CDM being offered to project developers 
or project operators potentially creating a public image that no additional emissions reductions are 
taking place. This public perception issue is however attenuated by the visibility of co-benefits 
resulting from activities supported by Ci-Dev and we do not expect perverse incentives to become an 
issue in this context. 
Once former Non-Annex-1 countries are bound to mitigation commitments in their NDC post-2020, 
countries might fail to prevent double claiming of emissions reductions if they have not properly 
implemented registries to account for the corresponding emissions credits. In such an instance, 
emissions reductions could be issued for the Ci-Dev project while still being counted by the host 
country towards its NDC. A more severe form of double claiming would occur if Ci-Dev projects would 
                                                     
3 We apply the same definitions for the various forms of “double counting” as Schneider et al. (2015) 
– see textbox 2. 
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also be registered under a bilateral market mechanism such as the JCM. While there currently is no 
overlap in JCM activities with Ci-Dev and it does not seem likely that the specific activity types 
supported by Ci-Dev could also be funded by the JCM, and by other such bilateral mechanisms if 
they emerge. It is therefore important to monitor such developments and work to avoid double 
claiming as any such overlap could do damage to the reputation of the Ci-Dev program. 
Additionally, an image risk could emerge outside of influence of Ci-Dev potentially already before 
2020, if public attention is drawn toward emerging instruments with potentially uncertain 
environmental integrity under the CAs and the reputational damage spills over to market instruments 
in general. Buyer countries might as a consequence back away from both the CDM and the SDM. 
Finally, it is also in principle possible that the SDM does not evolve into a credible mechanism and 
that provisions on accounting at the UNFCCC level are not sufficiently stringent, leading to double 
counting of emissions reductions in host countries, which have unconditional mitigation targets.  
6 Potential climate policy opportunities for Ci-Dev 
activities pre 2020 
While generating risks, international climate policy developments can also present opportunities for 
Ci-Dev activities. We first look at the short term until 2020.  
6.1 Hybrid PoA-NAMA structures 
While some pilot activities have attempted combined approaches (Ngabo et al. 2013), to utilise the 
PoA to provide incentives for scaling up mitigation within the enabling environment of a dedicated 
policy framework, this is yet largely untested territory (Michaelowa et al. 2013). the potential for this 
model to be scaled up to meet NAMA objectives could be enhanced by international support through 
pioneering institutions in partnership with governments and private sector participations, and could 
also potentially include Ci-Dev. 
6.2 Blending of climate finance with market mechanisms 
While in the past, there was an “iron curtain” between the CDM and the Global Environment Facility, 
blending of climate finance with market mechanism revenues is becoming increasingly accepted. 
There are numerous opportunities for such blending, particularly with regard to overcoming 
investment barriers due to a lack of experience with the currently evolving new market instruments. 
Units under a pilot-phase SDM could potentially already be used by climate finance institutions pre-
2020, which would help prevent that these institutions “reinvent the wheel” for results-based finance.  
However, the GCF’s is expected to take the issue of environmental integrity seriously and therefore 
will be unlikely to apply anything but robust baseline and monitoring methodologies in a manner that 
is comparable across projects. Given challenges in upscaling its project pipeline, by acquiring and 
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retiring CDM – and later SDM - credits the GCF could rapidly demonstrate mitigation results in an 
internationally recognized manner. In this sense, climate finance could act as bridge to support 
market mechanisms based mitigation activities and address investment barriers that are preventing 
projects occurring in underrepresented countries, in a period in which demand from compliance with 
mitigation targets is lagging – until new demand resulting from increased ambition resulting from 
NDCs can drive prices higher. 
 Demand for credits from Ci-Dev projects would increase the likelihood that these projects perform. 
6.3 New sources of demand for CERs  
New uses of the CDM that could lead to additional demand (UNFCCC 2016c), coming from domestic 
carbon pricing schemes in developing countries, but also from new sectors such as aviation: While 
for aviation it is unclear what quality criteria would be applied, demand could be as large as 40% of 
available CERs in 2020-2030 (970 million CERs) as estimated by Thompson Reuters analysists 
(Garside 2016). Domestic developing country policy instruments that could potentially generate 
demand to keep credits in the country will most likely only concern more advanced developing 
countries and are thus not relevant for Ci-Dev. As mentioned, there are several approaches to embed 
CDM activities in NAMAs and thus also in NDCs (Michaelowa et al. 2015). In view of the need for 
best-practice examples how the SDM or CAs could be operationalized, early action pre-2020 
potentially with banking of credits will increasingly become important. Here the countries that 
declared the support for market mechanisms in Paris – the EU but also Canada, New Zealand 
Norway, Switzerland, and the US are critical in providing resources for such pilot schemes.  
7 Opportunities post-2020 
Post-2020 a whole new situation regarding supply and demand is to be expected. Demand for credits 
from those NDCs that are ambitious could be substantial, but potential buyer countries (primarily 
developed countries) have so far not publicly clarified what types of international emissions credits 
would be eligible toward their NDC nor are their NDCs sufficiently ambitious – both compared to the 
global ambition level – resulting in approximately 2.7°C by 2100 (UNFCCC 2015) and their domestic 
mitigation potentials as estimated by most observers. The ambition of the PA enshrined in its long-
term goal and the inclusion of a review mechanism could over time result in improved ambition in 
NDCs of buyer countries. Greater ambition could be supported if emissions reductions from the SDM 
are cheaper than further reductions domestically and are not perceived as having environmental 
integrity issues. Ci-Dev could in this context demonstrate best practice in developing sustainable 
business models for scaled up activities with high development benefits and such development would 
fully align with the objective of Ci-Dev to act as a market enabler. 
At the same time the situation regarding supply is also expected to change: Differentiation could 
reduce supply as fewer countries and sectors are eligible to export units with demand for emissions 
reductions domestically in developing countries, especially emerging economies, growing due to the 
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new obligations. Ongoing Ci-Dev activities could demonstrate to international donors how results-
based mitigation can work effectively.  
Many stakeholders expect crediting of policies and NAMAs post-2020 as illustrated by the growing 
number of publications on this (Wooders et al. 2016). Ci-Dev could be playing a pioneering role in 
developing appropriate methodologies that contribute to a high environmental integrity of the SDM 
and other scaled-up mechanisms. 
 
8 Analysis of risks and opportunities at country level 
We have analysed the INDCs of all 48 Ci-Dev eligible host countries bearing in mind the potential 
risks that could arise for Ci-Dev operations discussed in section 5. For this purpose, we have chosen 
a number of categories (mitigation ambition, baseline transparency, and baseline stringency, 
commitment of government, stakeholder consultation, governance, and PoA participation) and rated 
each country according to comparable metrics for each category (see Table 1). We have used these 
metrics in combination in order to assess respective risks for each of the three main country-level 
risks identified toward Ci-Dev operations. Besides these categories of analysis based on a content 
analysis of countries’ official climate policy communications we have categorized countries according 
to the overall sophistication of their climate policy ensemble.   
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Table 1: Approach for ratings within each category (sources and results are detailed in Annex) 
Definitions LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Emission 
reduction target 
in INDC 
Less than 15% 
reduction from 
baseline 
15-40% reduction from 
baseline 
>40% reduction from baseline 
Baseline 
transparency 
No methodology for 
BAU scenario outlined.  
Reference to international 
methodological guidelines 
applied, however, no detailed 
description of methodology 
and used inventory data 
Detailed description of 
methodology and inventory 
data used  
(alternatively, direct reference 
to policy paper with such a 
BAU estimation)  
Baseline 
stringency 
Multiplication of 
emissions by more 
than 3 between 2010s 
and 2030 
Multiplication of emissions by 
2-3 between 2010s and 2030 
Multiplication of emissions by 
less than 2 between 2010s 
and 2030 
Commitment of 
government 
No description of 
responsibilities or 
institutional 
arrangement for 
operationalization and 
implementation of 
INDC 
Reference to responsible 
ministry and/or governmental 
agency, however, no further 
elaboration on institutional 
arrangement to ensure 
implementation of INDC or 
clear indication that the INDC 
is aligned with national 
(climate) strategies, policies 
and priorities 
Reference to responsible 
ministry and/or governmental 
agency and outline of 
institutional arrangement to 
ensure implementation of 
INDC and clear indication that 
the INDC is aligned with 
national (climate) strategies, 
policies and priorities. 
Stakeholder 
consultation 
No stakeholder 
consultation 
mentioned 
Stakeholder consultations 
mentioned, however, no 
clear participatory process 
and no information on kind of 
stakeholder outlined 
Inclusive and participatory 
stakeholder engagement 
during INDC preparation 
Engagement foreseen for 
implementation including 
specification of stakeholder 
types (public, private, NGO, 
international experts, etc.) 
Governance Ranked below 160th  Ranked between 100th and 
160th  
Ranked above 100th  
PoA 
participation 
2 and less PoAs 3-4 PoAs Over 5 PoAs 
 
8.1 Political risks regarding continued accrual of CERs  
The rationale of the assessment of the risk that CERs do not continue to accrue due to host country 
government action is described in the figure below. 
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Figure 6: Factors affecting risk that CERs do not continue to accrue due to government action 
 
                   
The following categories of the assessment are factors that could aggravate or attenuate this political 
risk. 
Ambition, baseline conservativeness and transparency 
In order to evaluate the level of risk of a government withdrawing an approval letter due to an overly 
ambitious mitigation target, we have assessed countries' INDCs regarding their real level of ambition, 
which results from information on a) the level of conservativeness of the INDC's baseline as well as 
the actual overall mitigation target. Given that many INDCs are not transparent with regard to their 
baseline definition, we have also assessed their level of transparency in order to also allow for a 
better understanding of the uncertainties associated with the baseline definitions. In many instances 
the INDC baseline is defined in an earlier biannual update report or a national communication. Where 
this is the case, we have assessed the baseline definitions presented in these documents with the 
same objective of analysing stringency and uncertainty of the mitigation target in relation to the 
baseline in order to gauge how strongly a country could come under pressure to count emissions 
reductions from the corresponding activities toward its own NDC. If a country has overly ambitious 
policies or targets in place in a sector in which Ci-Dev is active, this could aggravate the risk of 
expropriation as the host country could seek to stop the operation of a PoA in order to incorporate the 
same activity and its emissions reductions in its policy. Given that this would represent an act of bad 
governance only conceivable in countries with a known record of disrupting business, this 
assessment category is only relevant in combination with a low score in the risk of doing business 
ranking (‘Ease of doing business report’ (World Bank 2016). see below). 
INDC Quality and Reliability 
In order to assess potential conflicts or overlaps between sectoral efforts that could lead to a 
significant difference between sectoral mitigation potentials and the national mitigation target defined 
in the INDC, potentially affecting both the environmental integrity and the risk of withdrawing the letter 
NDC ambition
Conditional 
contribution
If climate finance 
is not 
forthcoming, risk 
increases 
Unconditional 
contribution
If mitigation 
outcomes are less 
than expected, 
risk increases
Good 
governance
Respect of 
ownership and 
contractual relations
Quality of climate 
policy instruments
Reliability of baseline 
& mitigation 
potentials
If policy scopes 
overlap, risk increases
Positively 
correlated 
to risk 
Negatively 
correlated 
to risk 
Negatively 
correlated 
to risk 
The Impact of INDCs, NAMAs and LEDS on Ci-Dev Operations and Programs 
 Page 31 
of approval, we have qualified the robustness of the planning process leading up to the publication of 
the INDC. Our assessment of “robustness” is based on an assessment of:  whether an adequate 
stakeholder consultation process had taken place, whether the country was rather a latecomer or 
early mover in presenting its INDC, the level of government that was involved in the process and the 
INDCs' consistency with previously existing climate policy instruments. 
Overlap of policy scopes 
The higher the number of policy instruments and the lower the degree of coordination between them, 
the higher the risk that the overall mitigation achieved by them is overestimated because both direct 
and indirect effects are counted twice (see Figure 4). We therefore look at the overall numbers of 
policy initiatives undertaken. 
8.2 Project operation risk due to CDM obsolescence  
Potential obsolescence of the CDM due to lacking host country engagement. 
Previous experience and success with PoAs 
Existence of a robust CDM and in particular a PoA pipeline is a strong indication of the current 
regulatory environment’s attractiveness for mitigation action. Countries with a strong track record and 
positive experiences with market mechanisms overall are more likely to continue efforts to maintain 
that positive environment also when other climate policy efforts (climate finance for NAMA 
implementation or the SDM etc.) kick in. 
Regulatory environment for project developers: Ease of doing business ranking 
A stable regulatory environment for project development and operation in the host countries is an 
important determinant of the continued supply of CERs in Ci-Dev projects. To include this factor in 
our analysis we have included the country ranking of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of doing business 
report’ (World Bank 2016). The ranking provides a snapshot of the current regulatory environment for 
business activities across all economic sectors, but does not represent an indication of a country’s 
honouring of international agreements. 
Governance capacity: Quality of INDC, NAMAs and LEDS 
To better understand the level of efforts each host country is putting in advancing policies that could 
affect Ci-Dev activity types (energy access, renewables and improved domestic energy efficiency) we 
have evaluated the quality of INDCs, screened for the countries’ NAMA development and concrete 
measures toward achievement of LEDS. The preparation of NAMAs in particular indicates the level of 
advancement of a country’s mitigation policy toolset. Thus, the efforts into NAMA development are 
also a key factor in our determination to which category a country belongs to. Numerous countries 
have neither publicly put forward plans for NAMAs nor LEDS. High capacity can mean a great ability 
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and willingness to undertake credible mitigation action; this is thus ultimately a key indicator for 
reliability of host countries. 
8.3 Approach to the analysis regarding environmental integrity risk 
At the country level, potential environmental integrity risk is viewed to be influenced by the already 
mentioned overlaps of (potential) Ci-Dev activities with NAMAs under development, which could 
result in double claiming. In addition, the countries’ level of interest in bilateral mechanisms, and the 
countries’ interest in market mechanisms as described in the following are key factors. 
Mitigation policy overlaps with Ci-Dev activities  
Among those countries that have publicly presented NAMAs or LEDS, we have identified potential 
overlaps with Ci-Dev activities, which should be monitored for their impact on operating conditions of 
Ci-Dev projects. In areas, in which such overlaps most likely will be advancing CDM projects (such as 
sector-wide measures incentivizing renewables) the risk of regulatory barriers is attenuated, while the 
risk that activities become non-additional and the risk of perverse incentives is increased. In some 
instances such an overlap could indicate greater likelihood that the host country will seek to 
discontinue operation of a PoA in order to include the same activity in its policy. 
Risk resulting from bilateral mechanisms: is the country currently a JCM host country? 
Countries, which host bilateral mitigation actions, could – if they do not set up proper registries for the 
corresponding emissions reductions – create a potential for double claiming. Currently the only such 
mechanism is the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) by initiative of the Japanese government. 
Several of the Ci-Dev eligible countries are also JCM host countries (Ethiopia, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar), however no actual project activities have been set up in these 
countries. But – especially in countries with limited capacity to set up a registry and create 
transparency in accounting emissions reductions – developments with regard to the JCM should be 
monitored.  
INDC and Market Mechanisms 
In order to assess to which extent a country is at risk to inadequately prevent double counting of 
emissions from CDM projects and measures taken to achieve their INDC, we assess whether the 
INDC documents provide an indication of the countries willingness and ability to address double 
counting. Furthermore, a key question is whether a country indicates willingness to use market 
instruments for achieving its (I)NDC. 
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8.4 Results of the analysis 
The complete results of the analysis following the approach outlined in Table 1 are found in the 
Annex including a traffic-light indication of the conclusions in regard to the key risks previously 
outlined in section 5. 
In the following, we are now presenting some key highlights along the structure of presenting country 
examples in the three country categories according to countries’ level of sophistication of climate 
policy instruments and related governance capacities: Country type C having presented an INDC with 
limited specificity and no significant supporting policy documents, country type B having prepared 
and published an INDC and having engaged in concrete mitigation activities such as development of 
NAMAs, and having a certain level of CDM activity, whereas country type A can boast a fully-fledged 
national greenhouse gas reduction strategy and has utilized many climate policy instruments in a 
mutually reinforcing manner to achieve real mitigation and sustainable development co-benefits. 
8.4.1 Country type C: least advanced mitigation policy instruments 
The countries with the least developed climate policy toolsets and the most limited capacity for 
governance on climate change mitigation among Ci-Dev eligible countries are: Benin, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), East Timor, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Myanmar, Niger, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen. Of those 
countries, particularly DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar could gradually become more relevant 
due to a high mitigation potential linked to hydropower, biomass utilization and efficiency 
improvement in cities, but their governance challenges will likely prove limiting factors. Myanmar 
could also become an increasingly attractive host country as it is likely to improve its governance in 
the future due to the ongoing political transition. 
The key country challenge in this group is the low level of governmental capacity for designing and 
implementing mitigation policies and consequentially the limited awareness with regard to technical 
issues such as double counting. In addition, there could potentially be a risk of a flawed 
understanding or limited public awareness to protect ownership of mitigation outcomes from CDM 
activities – in particular in countries with limited to zero CDM activities. Beyond, countries in this 
group could have the highest risks related to erratic government decisions even at internationally 
visible levels such as the scope of NAMAs (where existing) or INDCs. 
Most countries in this category do neither have ambitious targets nor conservative baselines. Those 
that have not made their baselines transparent might be clarifying them through a later revision of the 
NDC. Sierra Leone appears to have both an ambitious target and a conservative baseline, and could 
thus be at risk of wanting to appropriate emissions reductions from CDM activities. 
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Given that many countries in this group are in somewhat unstable political circumstances, the CDM 
often not being a high political priority, and given the limited experience with CDM activities, the risk 
of regulatory changes negatively affecting CDM activities in the country is highest in this group. 
Particular countries in this category could benefit from building capacities to access carbon markets 
in the future, if their political stability and general governance situation allows for this. The focus in 
these countries should be to strengthen basic capacities through engagement in cost-effective 
projects of smaller volumes without taking an overly great risk of investing into projects that could 
likely be discontinued due to reasons beyond the influence of the program. However, if other 
regulatory barriers are to be expected due to insufficient governance capacity, such capacity building 
efforts can also easily be lost. For ensuring high effectiveness in achieving mitigation action, Ci-Dev 
might focus its efforts among countries in this group to those which show the most tangible 
governmental support for CDM projects. Unfortunately none of the countries in this category have 
any relevant CDM experience in activities supported by Ci-Dev. Efforts in these countries should in 
particular take the risks from bottlenecks in dysfunctional regulatory processes into account (e.g. no 
LoA, no licences or permits for implementation). The risk of doing business ranking could provide 
some limited indication as to this type of operational risk, but actual knowledge of the situations in the 
respective institutions is necessary for a robust assessment of which countries could be best 
advanced.  
8.4.2 Country type B: intermediate mitigation policy instruments 
The middle category is the largest one; it includes: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Cape Verde, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The countries in this category 
tend to have developed at least a relatively specific INDC and can demonstrate some level of activity 
regarding NAMA development in particular sectors. In addition, at least a few CDM projects are 
operational, indicating that the governmental capacity and the regulatory environment in general 
appears sufficient for continued operation of CDM projects. However, many of these countries have 
general difficulties with regard to good governance or limited government capacity to implement 
robust mitigation action. As observed in the INDC development process of some of the countries, 
data is insufficient and many have not defined quantitative targets.  
In these countries, however, by far not all sectors are addressed by detailed NAMA feasibility studies 
or concrete policies4. The estimation of mitigation potential in these sectors thus does not have a 
strong foundation. Those countries in this category which have a conservative baseline and 
ambitious mitigation targets5 could therefore be most at risk of appropriating CERs occurring from 
                                                     
4 For the assessment of the NAMA pipeline refer to the Annex. 
5 This includes Cape Verde, Gambia and Zambia 
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CDM activities in the country if they overestimated their real mitigation potential or ability to induce 
the corresponding emissions cuts.  
Nigeria has a large mitigation potential and a highly ambitious target on off-grid solar electrification: 
its unconditional scenario includes providing 13 GW of renewable electricity to rural communities 
currently off-grid – an effort which is in line with one PoA in Ci-Dev’s support pipeline (see Annex). At 
the same time the country also is known for its severe governance challenges. While such a country 
should not be the place for experimentation, it could reliably host Ci-Dev activities as the track record 
of PoAs in the area of household energy shows. In such a case developments on NAMAs and INDC 
implementation should be watched, as they could represent both an opportunity for project 
developers as well as a risk for ongoing activities. 
With its NAMA concept on biomass energy, Burkina Faso has reached the in-depth appraisal phase 
of the NAMA Facility. However the development of the NAMA concept has stalled due to lack of 
clarity on the institutional responsibilities. If the NAMA eventually goes forward, it could represent 
both an opportunity to advance energy-related activities in Burkina Faso, but due to its broad energy-
sector scope could also affect the PoA for dissemination of bio digester systems included in the Ci-
Dev pipeline. Given that at this preliminary stage of NAMA development no specific policy 
instruments have been defined, its consequences are unclear. The NAMA could arguably improve 
the business environment e.g. facilitating access to financing and thus strengthen competition in the 
market, but given the slow pace of the NAMA development it is unlikely that severe changes will 
occur in the near future. 
Cambodia has a robust record of CDM activities, however the general governance situation is 
challenging. Cambodia is also one of the active JCM host countries. While the PoA activities could 
lend themselves for Ci-Dev involvement and while there is no current threat, activities in Cambodia 
should be watched for future NAMA developments and JCM activities that could undermine credibility 
of CERs or reliable continuation of PoAs. 
Gambia has no real experience in the CDM, a high ambition and stringent baseline in its INDC and is 
willing to use market mechanisms to achieve its target. It has an explicit objective of increasing rural 
electrification through renewable energy in its set of NAMAs. If Ci-Dev were to become active in 
Gambia e.g. by exploring synergistic NAMA development based on a PoA) it would need to make 
sure that Gambia will not view CDM activities as both a source for domestic mitigation as well as 
revenue from sales of CERs. 
Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nepal, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal have some experience in Ci-Dev 
relevant PoA activities, limited ambition in their INDCs and no overlap with NAMAs. These are 
countries which could be further considered for PoA activities, and in which no specific policy 
changes are to be expected resulting from INDCs and NAMAs. For assessing their potential, the 
specific focus should be on the particular business environment for developing energy related 
activities and the climate policy track record. Bhutan, Senegal, Ghana and Zambia stand out for their 
good governance and in particular Senegal has a robust and long-standing climate policy 
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engagement, so our recommendation is to further screen for potential activities in these latter 
countries. 
The key challenges in the group of countries in category B are due to the greater number of NAMAs 
and related policies that concern mitigation activities, which can cause interferences and 
inconsistencies between sectors or toward the INDC due to potential flaws in the design process.  
8.4.3 Country type A: advanced mitigation policy instruments 
The countries with the most advanced climate policy toolset include Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and 
Uganda.  
The key challenge in this country group could be the countries’ ability to attract potentially large sums 
of climate finance, which could draw some attention away from CDM activities in particular if the 
general level of support for market instruments is weak. In addition, countries in this group could be 
experimenting with new forms of developing NAMAs (e.g. hybrid PoA-NAMA), which would require 
addressing a number of accounting issues. The same experimentation could however also attenuate 
the risk of neglecting CDM projects, in particular if such a NAMA draws part of its revenues from CER 
sales. Overall, the risks from appropriation or regulatory barriers seems most limited in this group, 
due to an advanced governance capacity and transparency, as well as proactive international 
engagement in the UNFCCC, which causes greater exposure to international scrutiny. 
Ethiopia developed a far-reaching Climate-Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy in 2011. It has 
a very ambitious policy to keep its energy system on a low-carbon path. A dedicated CRGE Facility 
tries to coordinate climate finance mobilization, NAMAs and carbon market mechanism engagement. 
However, Ethiopia’s attempts to mobilize GCF funding have so far been unsuccessful, although the 
Ministry of Finance has received both GCF and Adaptation Fund accreditation in March 2016. A GCF 
proposal has been prepared by the Ministry of Energy that covers off-grid energy access 
technologies that are relevant for Ci-Dev activities. Potential linkages between the draft GCF 
proposal and Ci-Dev PoAs could be explored by Ci-Dev in order to set a precedent for linking carbon 
markets and climate finance, as per the most recent CMP annual guidance to the CDM EB. 
Uganda has been a pioneer in applying the concept of a renewable energy feed in tariff in a poor 
developing country context. Moreover, it has used the CDM from its earliest days, often in close 
collaboration with the World Bank. The Ci-Dev has two Uganda based activities in the pipeline and 
we recommend to build further on these activities. 
Rwanda has a coordinated approach to NAMA development and climate finance mobilization through 
skilled government agencies. It is the first country that has been able to access the GCF’s Project 
Preparation Facility. While the country will only communicate a quantitative mitigation target in 2017, 
this is appropriate and indicates a willingness to present robust numbers on the basis of sufficient 
information. It has strong sectoral targets and in particular foresees measures to roll-out solar mini-
grids, enhance energy efficiency. Having participated in exploring innovative combinations of PoA 
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and NAMA for improved cook stoves and water filters (Michaelowa et al. 2013), Rwanda could be an 
ideal country to pilot such scaled-up actions that draw on both instruments in a complementary 
manner. The key question is how emissions reductions will be counted toward the various 
stakeholders involved in such public-private partnership activities in order to prevent double counting, 
while creating the right incentives to engage on costly activities such as distribution, capacity building 
and MRV at household level. Given that the indicated climate finance needs are relatively large and 
given that the INDC indicates the countries willingness to use market instruments, such a hybrid 
programmatic-NAMA design needs to be done in a clear understanding that the government of 
Rwanda will not be able to receive both international support and full ownership over the mitigation 
units. 
8.5 Summary of country-level challenges and opportunities 
Countries which demonstrate clear challenges in particular categories such as good governance or 
past experience in CDM activities may quite clearly not be the best targets for effective mitigation 
action under Ci-Dev but could benefit from targeted capacity support. Other risk categories need to 
be addressed on a country-by-country basis to judge the potential effectiveness of interventions to 
leverage mitigation action. Nevertheless, some tendencies regarding the categories of countries in 
which particular opportunities or risks are more or less pronounced can be identified: 
If mitigation effectiveness is the overriding objective, countries in category C may only be addressed 
through a targeted approach focussing on those countries with the most experience in CDM projects, 
and where an improvement of governance is likely in conjunction with the existence of a significant 
mitigation potential. At the same time, interventions by the World Bank Group have the unique 
potential to address some of these country-specific challenges and to enable them to access 
international carbon markets and climate finance in the long run: Here, fundamental aspects are most 
important, namely the functioning of the CDM process and regulation as indicated by previous 
experience in the CDM. Secondly, the evolving country risk levels resulting from conflict or corruption 
as generally visible in international news media should be seen as an overriding factor. Thirdly, in 
view of limited governance capacity, overlaps of potential activities with mitigation policies should be 
assessed carefully, given that these can provide for both an improvement of the business situation, 
as well as a risk of creating perverse incentives. 
In countries featuring in category B, the approach could be a bit more opportunity-oriented: By 
focussing on countries with high interest in activities bringing together mitigation and development as 
expressed through their NAMA pipelines or sectoral targets high government commitment can be 
harnessed to mobilize action also if CDM experience to date has been limited. Nevertheless, from the 
beginning, the conversation surrounding CDM activities should manage expectations with regard to 
counting emissions reductions toward the NDC, and work to address this in contractual 
arrangements. This would reduce the risk of future withdrawal of approval letters by the host country 
after 2020 in order to meet its NDC. This country category could benefit significantly from capacity 
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building on CDM MRV. Hereby, technical capacity under the emerging SDM could emerge as a co-
benefit. 
Countries in category A offer the highest level of opportunities for experimentation with innovative 
approaches to scaling up of mitigation action toward NAMAs and INDCs and for piloting activities 
toward the SDM, such as through hybrid design of NAMAs building on PoAs. Feasibility studies and 
pilot activities could be combined with capacity building toward crediting of policy actions. Given their 
level of coordination and previous efforts, we recommend to focus such experimental action on 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, LDCs with a critical mass of experience and political will on which to 
build. Pilot activities could become extremely relevant as best-practice examples for policy action 
under the SDM and show that even LDCs are ready for scaled up SDM action. Countries 
participating in such pilot activities could greatly benefit from the resulting capacity building effect, 
while good pilots improve the reputation of emerging carbon markets benefiting all potential host 
countries. 
 
9 Conclusions and recommendations 
Uncertainties regarding CER accrual to Ci-Dev before 2020 are much lower than for the post-2020 
period. Except the unlikely sudden emergence of a large new buyer of CERs or VERs at high prices, 
risks are rather limited. At the same time, CDM reform and negotiations over SDM modalities and 
procedures will continue and influence each other. If the SDM is seen as natural continuation of the 
CDM, CDM project owners will expect a natural transition of their activities into the SDM. Given the 
strong support for the Paris Agreement (175 Parties having signed the Agreement on 22nd April 
2016), there is a realistic possibility that the PA may actually enter into force earlier than expected. 
This may imply a more immediate clarification of the relationship between the CDM and Art. 6 
mechanisms.  
During the pre-2020 period demand for CERs and other units that can be expected from NDCs will 
become clearer, including for using CDM as a building block for RBF mechanisms (similar to the Ci-
Dev approach), e.g. through the GCF. This relates both to the newly emerging domestic need for 
emissions reductions in developing countries as well as the developed countries’ willingness to fulfil 
or top up their NDCs with international units.  
Post-2020, risks for Ci-Dev activities increase substantially. If the SDM is not seen as seamless 
continuation of the CDM, CDM projects would need to be used to generate ITMOs under Article 6.2 
or  the generation of CERs would stop in 2020. Issuance for pre-2020 CERs can stretch up to 2023 
or the end of the Kyoto Protocol true-up period for the second commitment period. As NDC 
implementation periods start in 2020, governments will have a higher interest to scrutinize which 
share of the mitigation is sold abroad in form of credits and which share is retained domestically. 
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However, this will only become politically salient in 2023 when the first stocktake of NDC progress is 
undertaken, but particularly when the end date of the first NDC approaches, which generally is 2030. 
Our recommendations can be differentiated into those for the short term (up to 2020) and long-term.  
As an immediate step, Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) negotiated under Ci-
Dev have already anticipated various developments regarding the transition toward the SDM by 
including a relatively open description of what emissions reductions could be used for compliance 
with the ERPA post 2020. The wording “standard comparable to the CDM agreed upon by the 
Parties” might have to be refined further in order to prevent that counterparts argue that the post-
2020 mechanisms are “not comparable” and thus can retain credits.  
In the short term, the ambivalent situation regarding support for market instruments and the difficult 
market situation of the CDM putting those activities that do not benefit from similar support at risk of 
being discontinued dominates. We thus recommend Ci-Dev to take an even more active role in 
promoting the important benefits of market instruments as key implementation mechanisms for the 
Paris Agreement. This should be done by highlighting the quality of projects supported by Ci-Dev and 
encouraging other donors to maintain or increase support for ongoing activities in order to boost trust 
in market instruments. As political negotiations on the SDM advance in the next 2-4 years, Ci-Dev 
can support project owners by providing essential information and capacity building to maximise the 
chances for transferring activities into the SDM in the post-2020 market. Furthermore related capacity 
building from Ci-Dev could also benefit Ci-Dev host countries and enhance their capacities in taking a 
proactive role in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
As a lighthouse initiative, Ci-Dev can demonstrate that the CDM structure works and should serve as 
a blueprint for developing the SDM and a benchmark for cooperative approaches as well as 
showcase that links to climate finance could contribute to scaling up and replicating market based 
activities. In order to do this, we recommend Ci-Dev monitor decisions on NDCs with regards to 
carbon markets, in particular the SDM regarding possibilities for transferring activities from the CDM 
to the SDM so that projects can be assured a continued carbon revenue and Ci-Dev can continue 
acquiring similar shares of units from each PoA beyond 2020. 
In those countries that foresee use of a bilateral mechanism such as the JCM, Ci-Dev should be 
monitoring for any overlap in actual implementation of activities in order to ensure that registries to 
account for emissions reductions to address the issue of double claiming, apply best practice and 
effectively prevent that CDM emissions reductions directly benefit from such a bilateral mechanism. 
At the same time, the CDM provides clear regulation that effectively prevents activities generating 
CERs to be counted toward other mitigation obligations – bilateral mechanisms therefore in the 
authors’ view do not represent a risk to the public perception of the integrity of Ci-Dev activities. 
In the medium to long term, we recommend supporting pilot activities regarding the advancement of 
scaled-up action e.g. through embedding of PoA-style activities in NAMAs or through exploring the 
possibility for crediting policy actions. Ci-Dev could enhance its visibility as an innovative program 
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piloting new and important concepts of mitigation policy. Such innovative approaches could in 
particular be pursued in countries of category A and in particular Rwanda’s previous experimenting 
with combining PoA and NAMA lends itself as a highly interesting starting point for a PoA-based 
NAMA approach, whereas Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy strategy and high level of 
coordination lends itself to explore possible top-down policy crediting concepts. There are different 
models of such integration that can be explored, namely using the PoA “infrastructure” merely to 
guide activities developed as a NAMA or to buy CERs from PoAs to demonstrate verified mitigation 
results under a NAMA or to have both components side-by-side.  
In Ci-Dev eligible countries it is still early days to anticipate how NAMAs will evolve and specifically 
affect the business environment of ongoing CDM activities. Both in the short and the long term, a 
monitoring of those cases in which we have identified an overlap with the scope of the Ci-Dev 
program could allow identifying challenges to project operation or possible occurrence of perverse 
incentives. Within each host country, Ci-Dev could help project owners understand evolving 
regulatory implications of NAMAs as they are being developed over time.  
Given the emerging topic of blending climate finance sources we see the need for research to 
explore the impacts of competing pricing for emissions reductions from different climate finance 
sources. Specifically the question needs to be answered whether economic efficiency can be 
achieved while development benefits are delivered effectively, or whether trade-offs between these 
two objectives cannot be avoided. Furthermore, we recommend exploring the types of incentives that 
project participants are facing, by modeling complementarities amongst various types of finance for 
an actual Ci-Dev project and the different possible approaches for the blending of finance under 
varying price assumptions. 
In view of the importance of credible mitigation commitments and the debatable quality of some 
INDC’s baselines, there is an opportunity for Ci-Dev to highlight its experience supporting 
methodological work on baselines. Ci-Dev could be assisting key countries in revising the baselines 
of NDCs and NAMAs, building on the program’s experience in standardized baselines. Energy 
access methodologies as preferred by Ci-Dev are among the most highly standardized in the CDM 
toolkit, and are therefore the ideal pilot sector for sectoral crediting approaches that could become 
more relevant once the PA becomes effective. Furthermore, Ci-Dev could be providing important 
capacity building support at the intersection of carbon market activities and policies to ensure robust 
MRV and accounting system design and contribute to innovative approaches thus also harnessing 
possible synergies with other initiatives of the World Bank such as the Transformative Carbon Asset 
Facility. 
In selecting future activities for Ci-Dev to support, we recommend Ci-Dev projects to be selected and 
developed strategically by ensuring best compatibility with the most robust and credible greenhouse 
gas mitigation instrument that emerges in the climate policy landscape over the coming years. This 
will in all likelihood be the SDM. Furthermore Ci-Dev can contribute to making the SDM a credible 
mechanism by highlighting best-practice examples under the CDM and undertaking pilot activities for 
crediting of policies based on the methodological toolset of the CDM. At the same time, we 
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recommend supporting a selected group of countries standing out for their proactive engagement in 
negotiations to achieve their interest in a reliable market mechanism by maintaining an open 
information exchange on key issues regarding Art. 6. 
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